Senate deliberations over the foreign aid bill have proven a regrettable spectacle. Political antics aside, feature the lack of attention given to what should be America’s top foreign policy priority — countering Communist China. This would include prioritizing the Indo-Pacific which, despite a few useful appropriations, the bill fails to do. Its focus remains on Europe and the Middle East, much to America’s detriment.

No doubt, Israel, Ukraine, and the broader transatlantic alliance are crucial to American interests. A Russian victory in Ukraine could embolden further aggression, likely extending to our North Atlantic Treaty allies. Any fracture in America’s ties with Europe could also precipitate a European modus vivendi with Beijing. Should Israel falter in its war with Hamas, too, the resulting instability would reverberate beyond the Middle East.

Yet the bill fails to acknowledge that it is China that binds these crises together. Beijing’s purchases of Russian oil have largely shielded Moscow from the impacts of Western sanctions, fueling its military efforts. Iranian oil exports to China have tripled since 2020 to constitute 90 percent of its total oil exports. Meanwhile, Chinese weapons are being deployed against Ukrainians and Israelis — and, potentially soon, the Taiwanese.

Any legislation bearing the name “national security” should, at minimum, recognize and begin to address this threat. This means prioritization of the Indo-Pacific. The concern extends beyond the possibility of conflict over Free China, although that alone should be sufficient. It encompasses our regional defense posture which, if undermined, could embolden Beijing politically and militarily, and position it near to American territory.

The bill’s notable oversight is its failure to include the Compacts of Free Association, longstanding agreements upheld by Washington since the 1980s with the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau — collectively, the Freely Associated States. The COFAs grant Washington broad defense privileges and rights over the part of the Pacific between Hawaii and Guam known as the “Corridor of Freedom.”

It continues to our treaty allies Japan and the Philippines, on to Taiwan. In return for economic aid, the COFAs allow American military construction and troop deployment in the FAS nations. They also afford us strategic denial rights. This means America can unilaterally block China from accessing the territorial waters of COFA states. Should these arrangements be rescinded, it would amount to an American retreat from the Western Pacific.

And China’s entry. Beijing has long been expanding its naval presence beyond the First Island Chain. In 2008, a senior Chinese officer told Navy Admiral Timothy Keating, “You take Hawaii east. We’ll take Hawaii west.” The remark does not seem to have been made in jest. The COFAs are now up for renewal. The requested budget is for $7.1 billion over a 20-year period, yet the required offsets amount to $2.3 billion.

The funds are evidently unavailable. Yet available is $7.9 billion in non-military Economic Support Fund appropriations for budgetary support for Ukraine — an amount double that being directed to the Indo-Pacific. Also available, fortunately, is $1.9 billion under the Presidential Drawdown Authority to replenish weapons sent to Taiwan. This would allow for a swift provision of weapons from our stockpiles in the event of a pressing need.

Yet the bill lacks any measures that would prevent Washington from continuing to supply Ukraine, even if a more urgent need would arise from Taiwan. The message this sends to our Indo-Pacific allies is of a lack of seriousness, with potentially grim consequences for American security. Regional leaders have been sounding the alarm. Consider a scenario where Communist China has fortified the Western Pacific and moved on Taiwan.

With Guam encircled and our Western defenses cut off, neither America nor our allies Australia or Japan would be capable of much. Emboldened, Beijing would likely persist. What then? What of a free and open Indo-Pacific? What of China’s forays into the Arctic, in collaboration with Moscow? Or Iran’s naval ambitions in the South Pacific? The lasting repercussions of an inadequate American Indo-Pacific strategy could be devastating.

That is why it is significant. It is the foundation from which other geopolitical realities follow. This does not lessen the importance of other issues but highlights the need for a strategic approach rooted in America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The bill now heads to the House — with COFAs excluded and Taiwan but a footnote. There, it is likely to be dead on arrival. It may only be Wednesday, but it’s already a great week in Beijing.